Washington — A recent spate of articles has challenged the conventional wisdom that former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered the Palestinians nearly everything they wanted at Camp David, but the Palestinians turned him down and answered with the current intifada.
These pieces have received strong condemnation from individuals who are troubled by any questioning of the above-mentioned mantra. This knee-jerk response is simplistic at best. At worst, it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy about Israel lacking a negotiating partner or any feasible plan for ending its conflict with the Palestinians.
Whether one agrees with the articles in question, they reflect serious scholarship worthy of consideration. A more thoughtful look at them shows they are not necessarily inconsistent with the conventional thinking.
Further, it’s important to consider what such re-examinations of Camp David do not represent. First, they do not represent a whitewash of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat’s performance there.
Arafat’s passive behavior in the face of a series of offers from President Clinton and Barak — imperfect though the offers may have been from a Palestinian perspective — was a major source of frustration. It would have been preferable if Arafat had made counter-offers last summer — but the Palestinians were not prepared to make them at that time, and they told the Americans as much prior to the summit.
Second, these articles are not a new analysis of Barak’s operating style. Israeli voters elected Ariel Sharon, in part, because they were frustrated with Barak’s zig-zagging on positions, failure to consult allies and tendency to fly solo rather than take time to build consensus. If Israelis disliked Barak’s modus operandi, why should the Palestinians have liked it?
Third, the articles do not represent an excuse for the outbreak of violence that occurred last September. Arafat gave his word at the start of the Oslo process that Palestinians would forego violence to resolve their disputes with Israel.
At the very least, he allowed violence to continue unabated after the intifada broke out, including violence emanating from some of his security and intelligence agencies.
Understand the anger
But holding Arafat responsible for Palestinian violence is different than exploring why Palestinians had so much built-up anger against Israel seven years after the Oslo Accords were signed. Understanding that anger is important to breaking the current cycle of violence.
Dismissing the need for such understanding is done at Israel’s peril because the violence is likely to continue, as the Mitchell report concluded, if legitimate Palestinian frustrations remain unaddressed.
Fourth, these pieces do not represent a reason to attack personally and vilify authors who write things that are politically inconvenient. It is naïve to assume that everything humanly knowable about the Camp David talks emerged in the first few, spin-filled weeks after the summit broke up.
During that period, the Palestinians were largely silent about their positions and strategy, and more vocal commentators showed greater interest in casting blame than assuming responsibility. With a little distance and perspective, it may now be possible to get a better picture of what happened and why.
Fifth, they do not necessarily represent the last word on the subject. Significant historical events are hashed and re-hashed over time as more information is uncovered and different analytical perspectives are brought to bear. The Camp David negotiations will not be any different.
Several other major works on the matter are already being prepared. Some will agree with the current wave of critiques, and others will not; but each will likely contribute something to the public discourse.
Rather than contradicting all that the conventional wisdom holds, recent articles re-examining Camp David tend to broaden the list of factors that possibly influenced the outcome. If they seem to dwell on the negative aspects of Israel’s performance at the talks, that is probably because so little attention was paid to them before.
And when they challenge the conventional wisdom by looking at Israeli proposals from the Palestinian perspective, they serve to remind those of us who support Israel that negotiating among ourselves is not sufficient. Proper attention must be paid to the positions and political considerations of all the parties involved in the process.
Israel has been right enough over time to acknowledge when it is wrong and when its leaders have contributed to a tragic situation. Summarily rejecting critical analysis of Israel’s conduct at the Camp David summit is intellectually inexcusable and serves the interests of those who want to rule out the possibility of a negotiated end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Mark Rosenblum is founder and policy director of Americans for Peace Now.
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