The portion of Eikev, read in the synagogue this year on the third Sabbath of August,contains the second paragraph of the Shma (Deuteronomy 11:13-21). The first paragraph can be found at Deuteronomy 6:4-9. Two striking differences between these two paragraphs warrant close examination.
• The first paragraph is written entirely in the second person singular, and thus addresses the individual Jew. The second paragraph uses primarily the second person plural and is thus addresses Israel the nation.
• The first paragraph spells out several mitzvoth — Ahavat Ha-Shem (“the love of G-d”), the requirement to teach one’s children, the mitzvot of tefillin and mezuza — without any mention of reward for performance of these mitzvot or punishment for transgressing them. The second paragraph deals with the same mitzvot, but is explicit about reward or punishment.
Why this is so touches on a fundamental principle of Judaism. The concept of moral autonomy, that a human being can freely choose either righteousness or evil, is what’s at stake.
To be sure, that one course is labeled “righteous” and the other “evil” is indicative that the autonomy is not perfect and all choices are not equal. One’s choice, once made, entails consequences: G-d rewards righteousness and punishes evil.
The form that these consequences assume is problematic. If either reward or punishment is open and obvious, it impairs the freedom of human choice.
What idiots would ever transgress a negative commandment after having once seen a transgressor punished before their eyes? What fool would ignore a positive commandment after having seen its reward drop from heaven at the feet of one who has performed it? Under such a regime, the concept of “choice” is divested of meaning.
To read the complete article, see the August issue.
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