Philadelphia — Once upon a time, there was a renowned New York Times columnist named Thomas Friedman, who had two Pulitzer Prizes in his pocket and all the wealth and honor that such a person accrues.
But the book contracts, speaker’s fees, television appearances and freedom to work on his golf game weren’t enough. Something was wrong.
As a Middle East “expert,” Tom for years had been telling everyone from his bully pulpit that if only Israel would make enough concessions to the Palestinian Arabs, everything would be all right.
Sometime in the 1990s, Tom apparently figured out how to work the on/off switch on his computer, and this gave him an idea. He toured the globe, interviewing Third World leaders who generally told him what he wanted to hear — that all they really wanted was a new Lexus, a reliable cell phone and a satellite dish that receives the Playboy channel.
Tom sought to prove that the causes of conflict — pride, honor and religious fanaticism — would be erased by a drive for consumer goods. The desire of the Arabs for technology would make them forget about wanting to destroy Israel.
Then, in the summer of 2000, President Clinton’s passion for a Nobel peace prize and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s domestic political problems led them to a summit at Camp David, where Barak offered the Palestinians just about everything in his pocket.
The concessions were not supported by the majority of the Israeli people, would have divided Jerusalem and threatened Israel’s security. But Tom thought Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat couldn’t pass on such a sweet deal.
He was wrong. Arafat turned it down flat. Two months later, the old terrorist launched a war of attrition against Israel waged by both Islamic fundamentalists and Arafat’s own “police” forces. It was now apparent that the Palestinians weren’t interested in peace, even on their own terms.
Then came Sept. 11 and the support for Osama bin Laden around the Arab world — further proof of the importance of the fundamentalism that Tom thought was outdated.
Playing peacemaker
Tom viewed this not as a sign of his own intellectual bankruptcy, but as a failure of the Arabs to listen to him. He also resented critics who pointed out how wrong he had been all along. But rather than crediting them with a better understanding of the Palestinians, he just dismissed them.
Tom spent the next year-and-a-half sulking and tried to divert himself. But without the Middle East, he was just another smart-aleck with a cliché-filled style.
A few months later, Tom visited Saudi Arabia. But in spite of his championing of the Palestinians and derision for Israelis who aren’t leftists, he found most Saudis think of him as just another Jew.
Then he had a brilliant idea that, if properly promoted, might ensure that the Times’ new editor Howell Raines wouldn’t separate him from his expense account. In a column published Feb. 17, Tom floated a peace proposal.
Israel would unilaterally take everything it gained in the Six-Day War — including all eastern Jerusalem and all of Judea and Samaria — and give it to Arafat as a reward for his rejection of peace and the 18 months of war that killed hundreds of Israelis and Palestinians. In exchange, Saudi Arabia would recognize Israel’s right to exist.
According to his own breathless account, when Tom suggested this to Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, the prince said Tom was reading his mind; he had just such a proposal in his desk. Tom was thrilled and announced that peace was at hand, if only those pesky Israelis would carefully read his column.
Four days later, Tom’s self-promotion was embraced by the editorial page of the Times. On the same day, an article plugging the plan by Henry Siegman, the leftist former leader of the American Jewish Congress, was run on the opinion page.
Other good friends of Israel in Europe picked up the notion as did some in Israel who were looking for something to use against Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. News editors seized on this non-story and puffed it into a full-scale peace initiative.
The aim of all of this buzz was, in part, to pressure President Bush to abandon his strong support of Israel and his opposition to Arafat. Enemies of Sharon see the proposal as a way to shift blame for the war from Arafat to the Israeli government. Both the U.S. and Israel said they liked the idea of the Saudis showing support for any notion of peace, but it is a long way from there to something real.
So what’s wrong? Like so many other “peace initiatives,” the Friedman plan is a public relations effort aimed at Western audiences, not the Arab public. In fact, the Saudis never offered the proposal to anyone but Friedman. Its real purpose is to try to get the U.S. press to stop reporting about Saudi complicity in Islamic terrorism and anti-American extremism.
Second, the idea that an Israeli retreat to the 1949 armistice lines could bring peace is a fallacy. Arafat’s insistence at Camp David on the “right of return” for Palestinian refugees makes it clear that they still want the conflict to end with Israel’s destruction.
A unilateral Israeli withdrawal would also weaken Israel morally and militarily. Nobody even pretends any more that a Palestinian state will be demilitarized.
Such a retreat would also be analogous to Barak’s skedaddle from southern Lebanon before Camp David. Few would dispute that Hezbollah’s victory over Israel emboldened the Palestinians to attempt the current intifada. But this time, with the loss of all of Israel’s strategic depth, the consequences would prove even more dangerous.
Israel’s people are currently demoralized, with many wondering why Sharon has relied on half-hearted military measures against the terrorists while Jews are being murdered by Arafat’s minions every day.
Yet far from aiding Israel or the ever-suffering Palestinian people, the Friedman/Saudi plan helps only its authors and has diverted attention — at least for a few days — from Arafat’s war.
Friedman’s stunt won’t be anything more than a footnote in the history of the conflict. No Israeli government in the foreseeable future will repeat Barak’s mistakes, let alone exceed them as Friedman prescribes.
This story does illustrate how a powerful writer can use his position to promote a personal agenda. That is common enough.
But the way this self-infatuated journalist shamefully smeared his byline across a painful chapter in Jewish history should not be forgotten.
Jonathan S. Tobin is executive editor of the Jewish Exponent in Philadelphia.
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