By Mitchell G. Bard
The pro-Israel community is very good at responding to crises. Unfortunately, we fail to anticipate the future and prepare for issues that will become crises, or might be prevented from becoming emergencies if we took measures now.
Much effort is now being devoted to explaining Israel’s planned disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the attendant risks. This issue could, and should, have been explained at least two years ago, long before it was on Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s radar screen.
We cannot wait for issues to explode if we want to have any chance of shaping news media coverage or U.S. policy. But little is now being done to develop materials, arguments and strategies for the likely scenarios, such as:
• Israel Defense Force versus settlers: There are likely to be ugly scenes when Israel begins to evacuate Jews from Gaza. The situation will be worse if and when major settlements in the West Bank are removed.
If skillfully cast, the disengagement may play well in the United States because it will show the extent to which Israelis are willing to go for peace. But the sight of Jew-on-Jew violence may undermine the carefully cultivated image of Israelis being like Americans, and make them appear more like the querulous Arabs.
• The IDF reenters the Palestinian Authority: Once Israel redeploys from Gaza, the world will expect Israel to stay out and will protest if it crosses the frontier.
Given the P.A.’s record and the radicals’ expressions of commitment to the “armed struggle,” Israel likely will have to take preemptive or retaliatory action against Palestinians operating in Gaza or other territories. A strong case needs to be made in advance to explain the need to retain the right to self-defense.
• Opposition to the security fence: This issue is not going away.
Protestors already have attacked the fence or tried to disrupt construction. What happens if protestors get into clashes with troops? Israel will also continue to face criticism over the fence route and the hardships it causes Palestinians.
• When serious negotiations begin, or another unilateral disengagement is pursued, battle lines will be drawn over which settlements are incorporated into Israel and which must be evacuated.
Most Israelis don’t oppose withdrawing from isolated communities. However, a consensus exists over retaining the largest settlement blocs close to the Green Line. It will be vital to show how this can be done without jeopardizing the contiguity of a Palestinian state.
• Jerusalem: The Palestinians are not going to abandon their claim to Jerusalem, and Muslims aren’t going to acquiesce to Jewish control over their holy sites.
When all other issues are resolved and Jerusalem is the lone sticking point, the world will say the obstacle is Israeli intransigence over a city holy to three faiths that the United Nations 1947 partition resolution said should be internationalized.
• The “Right of Return”: P.A. President Mahmoud Abbas is particularly committed to the “right” of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. Americans still have trouble understanding why a person shouldn’t be allowed to go home.
The argument that Israel can’t remain a Jewish state if it were to absorb millions of Palestinians isn’t persuasive because many Americans are uncomfortable with the notion of a “Jewish state.”
In addition, the pro-Israel community has failed to put the Jewish refugees from Arab countries on the screen or to equate them with the Palestinian refugees.
• All hope for a negotiated solution has been placed in Abbas, who is not a young man. He could die or, more likely, fail to take the necessary measures.
Israel will then have two problems: The absence of a negotiating partner and the prospect of increased violence.
• Israel attacks Iran: Israel considers Iranian development of nuclear weapons to be an existential threat. If Israel believes Iran will not be deterred by diplomacy, it may take unilateral military action.
The international reaction would be similar to 1981, when Israel destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor; but the U.S. would be likely to veto U.N. condemnation this time.
The Arab world would be relieved at non-Arab Iran’s capability being delayed or destroyed, but publicly will be in an uproar that might further inflame the situation in Iraq and provoke greater anti-Israel and anti-American sentiment in the region.
• Iran gets nukes: If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, we will face new issues.
The presence of a nuclear power in the region besides Israel will alter the strategic balance in ways that need to be anticipated before they become a reality.
Mitchell G. Bard, Ph.D., is the author of 17 books including “The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Middle East Conflict” and “Myths and Facts: A Guide to the Arab-Israeli Conflict.”
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