If Geneva Accord is ‘virtual,’ why is it so hated? | Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle

If Geneva Accord is ‘virtual,’ why is it so hated?

If the Geneva Accord lauded by international leaders in Switzerland this week is an unofficial document with no government backing, why are so many Jewish right-wingers and Islamic militants so apoplectic about it?

They brand the authors “reviled and discredited” politicians and “traitors.” They describe their plan as “scandalous,” “treason,” “hallucinatory,” “surrender,” “suicide,” “Munich” and “dangerous.”

The authors, former Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin and former Palestinian Authority Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo, call their 50-page document an “unofficial framework” for peace. They have no illusions about their “virtual” pact being adopted, but say they’re only trying to show that agreement is possible

It’s one of several plans being circulated; but with endorsements from a broad range of international leaders, it is garnering the greatest attention.

It is rooted in the negotiations that took place between Israelis and Palestinians in the seven-month period beginning at Camp David in the summer of 2000 and ending at Taba the following February, including proposals introduced by the Clinton administration.

Beilin and Rabbo insist that an agreement might have been achieved with only a few more months of effort, but the real reason those talks failed was the persistent refusal of Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat to take any negotiations seriously.

Playing both sides

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon denounced the Geneva plan, calling it a “mistake” that does “damage” to the Jewish state and “an embarrassment” to Israel. That’s all Arafat needed to turn from opponent to quasi-supporter.

True to form, Arafat is playing both sides. He initially opposed the plan and threatened to block any Palestinian participation in Monday’s ceremony.

But when faced with Sharon’s rejection, Arafat capitalized on an opportunity to embarrass Sharon and portray the Israeli as the chief obstacle to peace — yet he adroitly avoided endorsing the plan himself. His “Yes, but” rendered any support he offered meaningless.

He achieved his goal. Sharon was cast as the bad guy by the Arabs, by international leaders backing the document and by the Israeli peace camp.

To them, Sharon is the Gypsy Rose Lee of peace making. He teases with tantalizing hints, some suggestive moves and the promise of much to come, but he manages to show nothing.

In recent days, Sharon has been talking about “important steps” he plans to take, hinting at the possibility of evacuating some settlements, about “painful concessions,” “positive unilateral steps,” “tough decisions and sacrifices” and a secret plan to end the violence and restore stability.

But he reveals nothing because he has no realistic plan, only veils and fans and whispered promises that quickly vanish.

So far he has had the advantage of no Arab interlocutor willing to call his bluff; and the continuing Palestinian violence has protected him from American pressure to demonstrate flexibility.

But there are signs the Bush administration is growing frustrated with Sharon, although it is carefully avoiding open confrontation. It is inhibited by domestic election politics and a shared animosity toward Arafat and the Palestinian extremist groups responsible for the violence.

The problem with sending subtle signals is that Sharon may mistake them for lack of resolve. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz have welcomed the Geneva Accord and other peace plans, even while saying the administration considers the Road Map outline the best route to peace.

Powell wouldn’t be disappointed if the message going back to the region is to get serious about the Road Map or the next Bush administration could raise the stakes by supporting alternatives the current Israeli government is certain to like even less. Powell’s spokesman denies the administration is engaged in an “end run,” but it is clearly encouraging these symbolic efforts as creating “an atmosphere of hope.”

The Geneva proposal is not a solution but one of several catalysts for discussion. Another has been presented by Sari Nusseibeh, a leading Palestinian moderate, and former Shin Bet director Ami Ayalon. Theirs is essentially a petition endorsing broad outlines of a peace agreement. So far, more than 110,000 Israelis and 65,000 Palestinians have signed.

Even hardliners have peace plans, albeit totally unrealistic one-state schemes based on a shared principle: It’s all mine because God gave it to me, and you can go to hell.
The plethora of plans is a sign of the gap between the people and their leaders. The proposals represent not so much realistic solutions as frustration with leaders who seem genuinely disinterested in seeking realistic solutions.

The only things more numerous than peace plans these days are excuses the leaders of both sides manage to devise to justify their inaction and demand that the other take the initiative.

The Geneva Accord includes terms that many veteran observers say will likely shape the eventual Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Nevertheless, real peace is probably years away and many people, some not yet born, will die on both sides while waiting for leaders with courage and vision.

Unofficial efforts like the Beilin-Rabbo plan don’t change that reality, but they are a partial antidote to the despair that has gripped both peoples.

Douglas M. Bloomfield is a Washington, D.C.-based syndicated columnist and a former chief lobbyist for AIPAC.