By M. J. Rosenberg
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is in trouble. Ever since last summer’s war in Lebanon, polls say Israelis have lost confidence in his leadership.
Next month’s Winograd report, an official investigation of the government’s conduct of the war, is expected to present even more problems for Olmert. Many in Israel believe the report could lead to the early demise of his government.
There is not much Olmert can do about any of this. The Lebanon war cannot be rolled back.
His best chance of saving his job lies in making progress toward an agreement with the Palestinians and, ideally, the Arab world in general. Luckily for him (and Israel), this appears to be an opportune moment on both fronts.
The recent establishment of a Palestinian unity government and the coming restatement of the Saudi (or Arab League) Initiative both present the possibility of movement, if that is what Olmert wants.
Neither the platform establishing the unity government nor the Arab League Initiative is perfect from Israel’s (or America’s) point of view. Hamas has not agreed to recognize Israel or to accept Israel’s previously negotiated agreements with the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The Arab League Initiative still calls for the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel (not only to a new Palestinian state) and for an Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, borders.
To many people, these defects make the proposals non-starters, not worth the paper they are written on. But viewing them that way is a mistake.
Find possibilities
In the case of the Arab League Initiative, Olmert and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni now concede that Israel blundered when then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon dismissed it out of hand in 2002. Both now say elements in the plan are worth considering.
Although they have not come around to seeing positive elements in the Palestinian unity agreement, that does not mean that there aren’t any which will perhaps only be recognized when the opportunity passes.
That is the story of Middle East diplomacy. Each side insists on seeing a half-empty glass as completely empty.
The secret of successful diplomacy is finding hopeful possibilities in the midst of seemingly hopeless intransigence.
By now everybody knows how, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, President John Kennedy got two messages from Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev within hours of each other.
The first was conciliatory and offered a basis for negotiating an end to the stalemate. The second, received a few hours later, was hard-line and indicated there was nothing to negotiate.
At first Kennedy assumed the second message rendered the first moot. But his advisers, led by his brother, Bobby, told him to ignore the second and respond positively to the first. Kennedy did and the world was saved.
Unfortunately, Israelis and Palestinians tend to do the opposite. Given a choice between seeing the best or the worst in the adversary’s position, they invariably choose the worst. Invariably, the worst then happens.
Recently, according to Yediot Ahronot, Dr. Ahmed Youssuf, the political adviser to Hamas, said that the organization has “decided to adopt a political course with the aim of achieving the same objectives for which it has been fighting by force of arms:
establishment of a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders, giving the refugees the right of return and release of all the Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails.”
Youssuf said, “Hamas would be willing to examine the Saudi Arabian initiative in a positive light, on condition that Israel promises to honor the initiative.”
He added that “Hamas is ready for a hudna [end of all violence] for ten years, with the option of extending it.” Then he warned that “If we do not succeed in reaching the achievements that we want, we will return to the path of armed struggle.”
As to the Hamas ideology that rejects Israel, he said, “We are willing to see changes in the ideology of Hamas in the near future. The political reality is leading to changes in some of the ideas of the movement.”
That may be so much hot air. But political organizations — even terrorist organizations — sometimes do change their ideologies as situations change.
The Arab (or Saudi) initiative remains one of the most promising frameworks that can be utilized to establish an Israeli agreement with the Palestinians.
Until now, the P.A. has not accepted it although every Arab state in the world has signed on, pledging to establish full normalization with Israel in exchange for an Israeli pullback to the 1967 lines and a Palestinian state.
From Israel’s point of view, the initiative’s calls for the return of refugees and full withdrawal make it less than optimal. But, in a meeting with the Saudi ambassador this winter, Israel Policy Forum was told that the initiative was not a take-it-or-leave-it offer but an invitation to start a process.
Now Hamas is saying that it too might endorse the plan, if only to ingratiate itself with the Saudis, the European Union, and the United States.
Dr. Ziad Asali, president of the American Task Force on Palestine and an advocate of the two-state formula, believes that is very good news.
Writing recently in the Washington Times, Asali said: “The Arab League initiative is a good starting point for negotiations between all parties interested in ending the conflict and the occupation. To bring these negotiations to fruition, Israel must accept the need to end the occupation, and the Palestinians must have a government that articulates a clear position for a two-state solution, one that says, ‘We seek to negotiate an independent state along the 1967 borders to live alongside Israel in peace’ — no more and no less.”
What is wrong with exploring the possibilities offered by the Arab League Plan? What is wrong with seeing if there is any “give” in Hamas’ position?
Sure, it’s easier to say no and demand that the other side accepts various conditions. But where does that get you? Exactly nowhere.
Engaging the Palestinians, under the rubric of the Saudi plan, would surely lead us to a better place.
M. J. Rosenberg is the Director of Israel Policy Forum’s Washington Policy Center.
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